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Abstract
The different semantics that can be assigned to a logic program
correspond to different assumptions made concerning the atoms whose
logical values cannot be inferred from the rules. Thus, the well founded
semantics corresponds to the assumption that every such atom is false,
while the Kripke-Kleene semantics corresponds to the assumption that
every such atom is unknown. In this paper, we propose to unify and
extend this assumption-based approach by introducing parameterized
semantics for logic programs. The parameter holds the value that one
assumes for all atoms whose logical values cannot be inferred from the
rules. We work within multi-valued logic with bilattice structure, and
we consider the class of logic programs defined by Fitting.
Following Fitting’s approach, we define a simple operator that al-
lows us to compute the parameterized semantics, and to compare and
combine semantics obtained for different values of the parameter. The
semantics proposed by Fitting corresponds to the value false. We also
show that our approach captures and extends the usual semantics of
conventional logic programs thereby unifying their computation.
Keywords : multi-valued logics, logic programming, logics of knowl-
edge, inconsistency.
∗A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the form of an extended abstract in
the conference Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS’99)
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1 Introduction
The different semantics that can be assigned to a logic program correspond
to different assumptions made concerning the atoms whose logical values
cannot be inferred from the rules. For example, the well founded semantics
corresponds to the assumption that every such atom is false (Closed World
Assumption), while the Kripke-Kleene semantics corresponds to the assump-
tion that every such atom is unknown. In general, the usual semantics of logic
programs are given in the context of three-valued logics, and are of two kinds:
those based on the stable models [8, 15, 16] or on the well-founded semantics
[19], and those based on the Kripke-Kleene semantics [3].
We refer to semantics of the first kind as pessimistic, in the sense that it
privileges negative information: if in doubt, then assume false; and we refer
to semantics of the second kind as skeptical, in the sense that it privileges
neither negative nor positive information: if in doubt, then assume nothing.
To illustrate these semantics, consider the following program:
P


charge(X) ← ¬innocent(X) ∧ suspect(X)
free(X) ← innocent(X) ∧ suspect(X)
innocent(X) ← free(X)
suspect(John) ←
The only assertion made in the program is that John is suspect, but we
know nothing as to whether he is innocent.
If we follow the pessimistic approach, then we have to assume that John
is not innocent, and we can infer that John must not be freed, and must
be charged. If, on the other hand, we follow the skeptical approach, then
we have to assume nothing about the innocence of John, and we can infer
nothing as to whether he must be freed or charged.
However, in the context of three-valued logic, one can envisage a third
semantics, that we shall call optimistic: if in doubt, then assume true. If we
follow this approach, then we have to assume that John is innocent, and we
can infer that John must be freed, and must not be charged.
Now, the optimistic approach can be seen as a counterpart of the pes-
simistic approach. To find a counterpart for the skeptical approach, one
has to adopt a multi-valued logic. In such a logic, one can envisage an
inconsistent semantics: if in doubt, then assume both false and true. Ta-
ble 1 summarizes the four possible semantics of P, where F , T , U and I
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stand for false, true, unknown and inconsistent, respectively.
Approach suspect(John) innocent(John) free(John) charge(John)
Pessimistic T F F T
Optimistic T T T F
Skeptical T U U U
Inconsistent T I I I
Table 1 - The four possible semantics of P
In this paper, we define the semantics of a program P using a parameter
α whose value can be any of the above four logical values. Once fixed, the
value of α represents the “default value” for those atoms of P whose values
cannot be inferred from the rules. We define a simple operator that allows us
to compute this parameterized semantics, and also to compare and combine
semantics obtained for different values of α. We show that our semantics
extends the semantics proposed by Fitting [6], and captures the usual se-
mantics of conventional logic programs thereby unifying their computation.
As a side-result, we propose a new semantics for logic programs, that can
be roughly described as a “compromise” between pessimistic and optimistic
semantics.
Motivation for this work comes from the area of knowledge acquisition,
where contradictions may occur during the process of collecting knowledge
from different experts. Indeed, in multi-agent systems, different agents may
give different answers to the same query. It is then important to be able to
process the answers so as to extract the maximum of information on which
the various agents agree, or to detect the items on which the agents give
conflicting answers.
Motivation also comes from the area of deductive databases. Updates
leading to a certain degree of inconsistency should be allowed because in-
consistency can lead to useful information, especially within the framework
of distributed databases. In particular, Fuhr and Ro¨lleke showed in [7] that
hypermedia retrieval requires the handling of inconsistent information.
The use of multi-valued logics is justified by the fact that it provides a
more natural modeling framework for the application areas just mentioned.
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Moreover, as Arieli and Avron showed in [1], the use of four values is prefer-
able to the use of three even for tasks that can in principle be handled using
only three values.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we re-
call very briefly definitions and notations from three-valued and multi-valued
logics, namely, stable models and well-founded semantics, Kripke-Kleene se-
mantics, Belnap’s logic, bilattices and Fitting’s programs. We then proceed,
in section 3, to define our parameterized semantics of a Fitting program P.
This is done by defining a parameterized operator whose fixpoints we call
the α-fixed models of P. Our treatment in this section is inspired by [6].
If the value of the parameter α is false, then the α-fixed models correspond
to the stable models proposed by Fitting. We also present an algorithm for
computing the α-fixed semantics of P. In section 4, we restrict our attention
to conventional logic programs. We show that their α-fixed models capture
the three-valued stable models, the well-founded semantics, and the Kripke-
Kleene semantics. We also provide a comparative study of the α-fixed models
for the four values of the parameter α, and propose a “compromise” between
pessimistic and optimistic semantics that in certain cases may lead to the
definition of a new semantics. Section 5 contains concluding remarks and
suggestions for further research.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Three-valued logics
2.1.1 Stable models and well founded semantics
Gelfond and Lifschitz introduced the notion of stable model [8], in the frame-
work of classical logic under the closed world assumption. This notion was
then extended to three-valued logics and partial interpretations: Van Gelder,
Ross and Schlipf introduced the well-founded semantics [19], and Przymusin-
ski defined the three-valued stable models [15]. In fact, as shown in [16],
Przymusinski’s extension captures both the bi-valued stable models and the
well-founded semantics.
In Przymusinski’s approach, a conjunctive logic program is a set of clauses
of the form A←− B1∧ ...∧Bn∧¬C1∧ ...∧¬Cm, where B1, ..., Bn, C1, ..., Cm
are atoms. In this context, a valuation is a mapping that assigns to each
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ground atom a truth value from the set {false, unknown, true}. A valuation
can be extended to ground litterals and conjunctions of ground litterals in
the usual way. To define the stable models and well-founded semantics of
a program P, one uses the extended Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation GLP
[15] which assigns to each valuation v another valuation GLP(v) defined as
follows :
1. Transform P into a positive program P/v by replacing all negative lit-
erals by their values from v.
2. Compute the least fixpoint of an immediate consequence operator Φ
defined as follows :
• if the ground atom A is not in the head of any rule of Inst-P/v,
then ΦP/v(v)(A) = false; here, Inst-P/v denotes the set of all
instantiations of rules of P/v;
• if the rule “A←−” occurs in Inst-P/v, then ΦP/v(v)(A) = true;
• else ΦP/v(v)(A) =
∨
{v(B) | A ← B ∈ Inst-P/v, where ∨ is the
extension of classical disjunction defined by:
false ∨ unknown = unknown;
true ∨ unknown = true;
unknown ∨ unknown = unknown.
The valuation v is defined to be a three-valued stable model of P if
GLP(v) = v. The least three-valued stable model coincides with the well-
founded semantics of P, as defined by Van Gelder et als [19].
It follows from the definition of Φ above that this approach gives greater
importance to negative information, so it is a pessimistic approach.
2.1.2 Kripke-Kleene semantics
Working with three-valued logic, Fitting introduced the Kripke-Kleene se-
mantics [3]. The program P has the same definition as for stable models,
but the operator Φ is now defined as follows :
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given a valuation v and a ground atom A in Inst-P,
• if there is a rule in Inst-P with head A, and the truth value of the body
under v is true, then ΦP(v)(A) = true;
• if there is a rule in Inst-P with head A, and for every rule in Inst-
P with head A the truth value of the body under v is false, then
ΦP(v)(A) = false;
• else ΦP(v)(A) = unknown.
It follows that this approach gives greater importance to the lack of infor-
mation since unknown is assigned to the atoms whose logical values cannot
be inferred from the rules, so it is a skeptical approach.
2.2 Multi-valued logics
2.2.1 Belnap’s logic
In [2], Belnap defines a logic called FOUR intended to deal with incomplete
and inconsistent information. Belnap’s logic uses four logical values, that we
shall denote by F , T , U and I , i.e. FOUR = {F , T , U , I}. These values
can be compared using two orderings, the knowledge ordering and the truth
ordering.
In the knowledge ordering, denoted by ≤k, the four values are ordered as
follows: U ≤k F , U ≤k T , F ≤k I, T ≤k I. Intuitively, according to this
ordering, each value of FOUR is seen as a possible knowledge that one can
have about the truth of a given statement. More precisely, this knowledge
is expressed as a set of classical truth values that hold for that statement.
Thus, F is seen as {false}, T is seen as {true}, U is seen as ∅ and I is seen
as {false, true}. Following this viewpoint, the knowledge ordering is just
the set inclusion ordering.
In the truth ordering, denoted by ≤t, the four logical values are ordered
as follows: F ≤t U , F ≤t I, U ≤t T , I ≤t T . Intuitively, according to
this ordering, each value of FOUR is seen as the degree of truth of a given
statement. U and I are both less false than F , and less true than T , but U
and I are not comparable.
The two orderings are represented in the double Hasse diagram of Fig-
ure 1.
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≤k
≤t
TF
U
I
Figure 1: The logic FOUR
Each of the orderings ≤t and ≤k gives FOUR a lattice structure. Meet
and join under the truth ordering are denoted by ∧ and ∨, and they are
natural generalizations of the usual notions of conjunction and disjunction. In
particular, U∧I= F and U∨I= T . Under the knowledge ordering, meet and
join are denoted by ⊗ and ⊕, and are called the consensus and gullibility,
respectively:
• x ⊗ y represents the maximal information on which x and y agree,
whereas
• x⊕ y adds the knowledge represented by x to that represented by y.
In particular, F⊗T = U and F⊕T = I.
There is a natural notion of negation in the truth ordering denoted by ¬,
for which we have: ¬ T = F , ¬ F= T , ¬ U= U , ¬ I= I. There is a similar
notion for the knowledge ordering, called conflation, denoted by -, for which:
- U= I, - I= U , - F= F , - T = T .
The operations ∨,∧,¬ restricted to the values T and F are those of clas-
sical logic, and if we add to these operations and values the value U , then
they are those of Kleene’s strong three-valued logic.
2.2.2 Bilattices
In [4, 13], bilattices are used as truth-value spaces for integration of in-
formation coming from different sources. The bilattice approach is a basic
contribution to many-valued logics. Bilattices and their derived sublogics are
useful in expressing uncertainty and inconsistency in logic programming and
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databases [1, 6, 14, 17]. The simplest non-trivial bilattice is called FOUR,
and it is basically Belnap’s four-valued logic [2].
Definition 1 A bilattice is a triple 〈B,≤t,≤k〉, where B is a nonempty set
and ≤t, ≤k are each a partial ordering giving B the structure of a lattice with
a top and a bottom.
In a bilattice 〈B,≤t,≤k〉, meet and join under ≤t are denoted ∨ and ∧,
and meet and join under ≤k are denoted ⊕ and ⊗. Top and bottom under
≤t are denoted T and F , and top and bottom under ≤k are denoted I and
U . If the bilattice is complete with respect to both orderings, infinitary meet
and join under ≤t are denoted
∨
and
∧
, and infinitary meet and join under
≤k are denoted
⊕
and
⊗
.
Definition 2 A bilattice 〈B,≤t,≤k〉 is called distributive if all 12 distributive
laws connecting ∨, ∧, ⊕ and ⊗ hold. It is called infinitely distributive if it
is a complete bilattice in which all infinitary, as well as finitary, distributive
laws hold.
An example of a distributive law is x ⊗ (y ∨ z) = (x ⊗ y) ∨ (x ⊗ z). An
example of an infinitary distributive law is x⊗
∨
{yi|i ∈ S} =
∨
{x⊗yi|i ∈ S}.
Definition 3 A bilattice 〈B,≤t,≤k〉 satisfies the interlacing conditions if
each of the operations ∨, ∧, ⊕ and ⊗ is monotone with respect to both
orderings. If the bilattice is complete, it satisfies the infinitary interlacing
conditions if each of the infinitary meet and join is monotone with respect to
both orderings.
An example of an interlacing condition is: x1 ≤t y1 and x2 ≤t y2 implies
x1 ⊗ x2 ≤t y1 ⊗ y2. An example of an infinitary interlacing condition is:
xi ≤t yi for all i ∈ S implies
⊕
{xi|i ∈ S} ≤t
⊕
{yi|i ∈ S}. A distributive
bilattice satisfies the interlacing conditions.
FOUR is an infinitary distributive bilattice which satisfies the infinitary
interlacing laws. A bilattice is said to be nontrivial if the bilattice FOUR
can be isomorphically embedded in it.
A way for constructing a bilattice is proposed in [9]. Consider two lattices
〈L1,≤1〉 and 〈L2,≤2〉. We can see L1 as the set of values used for representing
the degree of belief (evidence, confidence, etc.) of an information and L2 as
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the set of values used for representing the degree of doubt (counter-evidence,
lack of confidence, etc.) of the information.
The structure 〈L1 × L2,≤t,≤k〉 where:
• 〈x, y〉 ≤t 〈z, w〉 iff x ≤ z and w ≤ y,
(〈x, y〉 ∧ 〈z, w〉 = 〈min(x, z), max(y, w)〉), and
• 〈x, y〉 ≤k 〈z, w〉 iff x ≤ z and y ≤ w
(〈x, y〉 ⊗ 〈z, w〉 = 〈min(x, z), min(y, w)〉)
is a bilattice satisfying the interlacing conditions; it also satisfies the infinitary
interlacing conditions if L1 and L2 are complete. Moreover, it is infinitely
distributive if L1 and L2 are complete and infinitely distributive.
By abuse of notation we will sometimes talk about the bilattice B when
the orders are irrelevant or understood from the context. From now on,
we assume that the bilattices we use are infinitely distributive, satisfy the
infinitary interlacing conditions and have a negation unless explicitly stated
otherwise.
2.2.3 Fitting programs
Conventional logic programming has the set {F , T } as its intended space
of truth values, but since not every query may produce an answer, partial
models are often allowed (i.e. U is added). If we want to deal with incon-
sistency as well, then I must be added. Thus Fitting asserts that FOUR
can be thought as the “home” of ordinary logic programming and extends
the notion of logic program so that a bilattice B other than FOUR can be
thought of as the space of truth values.
Definition 4 (Fitting program)
• A formula is an expression built up from literals and elements of B,
using ∧,∨,⊗,⊕, ∃, ∀.
• A clause is of the form P (x1, ..., xn)←− φ(x1, ..., xn), where the atomic
formula P (x1, ..., xn) is the head, and the formula φ(x1, ..., xn) is the
body. It is assumed that the free variables of the body are among
x1, ..., xn.
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• A program is a finite set of clauses with no predicate letter appearing
in the head of more than one clause (this apparent restriction causes
no loss of generality [4]).
We shall refer to such an extended logic program as a Fitting program.
Fitting also defined the family of conventional logic programs. A conven-
tional logic program is one whose underlying truth-value space is the bilat-
tice FOUR and which does not involve ⊗,⊕, ∀,U , I. Such programs can be
written in the customary way, using commas to denote conjunction.
3 Parameterized semantics for Fitting pro-
grams
In the following, α ∈ FOUR, P is a Fitting program, V(B) is the set of all
valuations in B and Inst-P is the set of all ground instances of rules of P.
Some of the results in this section are inspired by [6] which deals only with
the case α = F .
3.1 Immediate Consequence Operators
First, we extend the two orderings on FOUR to the space of valuations V(B).
Definition 5 Let v1 and v2 be in V(B), then
• v1 ≤t v2 if and only if v1(A) ≤t v2(A) for all ground atoms A;
• v1 ≤k v2 if and only if v1(A) ≤k v2(A) for all ground atoms A.
Under these two orderings V(B) becomes a bilattice, and we have (v ∧
w)(A) = v(A)∧w(A), and similarly for the other operators. V(B) is infinitely
distributive, satisfies the infinitely interlacing conditions and has a negation
and a conflation.
The actions of valuations can be extended from atoms to formulas as
follows:
• v(X ∧ Y ) = v(X) ∧ v(Y ), and similarly for the other operators,
• v((∃x)φ(x)) =
∨
t=closedterm v(φ(t)), and
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• v((∀x)φ(x)) =
∧
t=closedterm v(φ(t)).
The predicate equal(x, y) is a predefined predicate defined by: for all
valuations v,
• v(equal(x, y)) = T if x = y,
• v(equal(x, y)) =F if x 6= y, and
• v(β) = β for all β in B.
The following contrajoin operation assigns a truth value to a ground atom
A independently of the truth value assigned to the negation of A.1
Definition 6 (contrajoin) Let v and w be in V(B).
The contrajoin of v and w, denoted v△ w, is defined as follows:
v△w(A)=v(A) and v△w(¬A)=¬w(A), for each ground atom A.
Contrajoin operations are extended to formulas by induction. The idea
is that v represents the information about A, and w the information about
¬A. For example, if v(innocent(John)) = T and w(innocent(John)) = U
then v△w(innocent(John)) = T , whereas ¬(v△w(¬innocent(John)) = U .
We can now define a new operator ΨαP which is inspired by [6]. It infers
new information from a contrajoin operation in a way that depends on the
value of the parameter α.
Definition 7 Let v and w be in V(B). The valuation ΨαP(v, w) is defined as
follows:
1. if the ground atom A is not the head of any rule of Inst-P, then
ΨαP(v, w)(A) = α
2. if A ← B occurs in Inst-P, then ΨαP(v, w)(A) = v△ w(B).
Clearly, the valuation ΨαP(v, w) is in V(B), and as the interlacing condi-
tions are satisfied by V(B), we can prove the following proposition.
1Our contrajoin operation is exactly the same as pseudovaluation in [6]. However, we
prefer the term contrajoin of v and w as it is more indicative of the fact that an operation
is performed on valuations v and w.
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Proposition 1 Let P be a Fitting program.
(1) Under the knowledge ordering, ΨαP is monotonic in both arguments;
(2) Under the truth ordering, ΨαP is monotonic (and moreover continuous)
in its first argument, and anti-monotonic in its second argument.
Proof.The proof makes use of the following lemma which is an immediate
consequence of the definition of contrajoin.
Lemma 1 Let v1, v2, w1, w2 ∈ V(B). We have:
(1) if v1≤kv2 and w1≤kw2, then v1 △ w1≤kv2 △ w2;
(2) if v1≤tv2 and w2≤tw1, then v1 △ w1≤tv2 △ w2;
Now, suppose v1≤kv2 and let A be a ground atom. We want to show
that ΨαP(v1, w)(A)≤kΨ
α
P(v2, w)(A). If A does not occur as the head of any
member of Inst-P, then ΨαP(v1, w)(A) = Ψ
α
P(v2, w)(A) = α. If A ← B ∈
Inst-P, then ΨαP(v1, w)(A) = v1 △ w(B), and similarly for v2, so, by part
one of the previous lemma, ΨαP(v1, w)(A)≤kΨ
α
P(v2, w)(A). The proof of the
monotonicity in the second argument is similar. Item (2) of Proposition 1 is
established by a similar argument using part 2 of the lemma.
Before we continue, we recall that according to the Knaster-Tarski the-
orem, a monotone operator f on a complete lattice L has a least fixpoint l
and a greatest fixpoint g. There are two ways of constructing these fixpoints,
and each leads to a technique for proving certain properties.
Following the first way, the least fixpoint of f is shown to be
∧
{x ∈
L|f(x) ≤ x}. It follows that if f(x) ≤ x, then l ≤ x. The greatest fixpoint
of f is shown to be
∨
{x ∈ L|x ≤ f(x)}. It follows that if x ≤ f(x), then
x ≤ g.
Following the second way, one produces a (generally transfinite) sequence
of members of L as follows: f0 is the least member of L. For an ordinal n,
fn+1 is set to be f(fn), and for a limit ordinal λ, fλ is set to be
∨
n<λ fn. The
limit of this sequence is the least fixpoint of f . This yields another method
of proof: by transfinite induction. If it can be shown that each member of
the sequence fn has some property, then the least fixpoint l also has the
property. For the greatest fixpoint, we construct a similar sequence: f0 is
the greatest member of L. For an ordinal n, fn+1 is set to be f(fn), and for
a limit ordinal λ, fλ is set to be
∧
n<λ fn.
It follows from Proposition 1 that the function λx.ΨαP(x, v) has a least
fixpoint and a greatest fixpoint for each ordering. We define now a new
operator Ψ′αP which associates each valuation v with one of these fixpoints
depending on the value of α. Ψ′αP(v) is the iterated fixpoint of λx.Ψ
α
P(x, v)
obtained from an initial valuation vα defined by: vα(A) = α, for all ground
atoms A.
Definition 8 Let v be in V(B). Define Ψ′αP(v) to be the limit of the sequence
of valuations (an) defined as follows:
• a0 = vα;
• an = Ψ
α
P(an−1, v), for a successor ordinal n;
• aλ =


∨
n<λΨ
α
P(an, v) for α = F∧
n<λΨ
α
P(an, v) for α = T⊕
n<λΨ
α
P(an, v) for α = U⊗
n<λΨ
α
P(an, v) for α = I
, for a limit ordinal λ.
In fact, we fix the truth value of negative literals with v, then we compute
the semantics of the positive program thus obtained (in a similar manner to
that of Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation).
We remark that Ψ′UP(v) is the least fixpoint of λx.Ψ
U
P(x, v) and Ψ
′I
P the
greatest fixpoint of λx.ΨIP(x, v) under the knowledge ordering. Ψ
′F
P (v) is the
least fixpoint of λx.ΨFP (x, v) and Ψ
′T
P(v) the greatest fixpoint of λx.Ψ
T
P (x, v)
under the truth ordering.
To illustrate this definition consider the following program P and let v
be the valuation which assigns to every ground atom the truth value U :
P


A ← B ∧ C
D ← ¬B ⊕ T
E ← A⊗ ¬D
B ← T
Atom A B C D E
Ψ′FP (v) F T F T U
To compute Ψ′FP (v), we first replace all negative literals by the value U ,
then we compute the least model of the positive program thus obtained (with
respect to the truth ordering) beginning with the valuation which assigns to
every ground atom the truth value F .
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3.2 The family of α-fixed models
We recall that a valuation v is a model of a program P if and only if for all
rules A←− B in Inst-P, v(A) ≤t v(B) [5]. By definition of Ψ
α
P , a valuation
v that verifies ΨαP(v, v) = v is a model of P. Now, every fixpoint m of Ψ
′α
P
verifies ΨαP(m,m) = Ψ
α
P(Ψ
′α
P(m), m) = Ψ
′α
P(m) = m, therefore m is a model
of P. So we can define four new families of models that we shall call α-fixed
models.
Definition 9 (α-fixed models) A valuation v ∈ V(B) is a α-fixed model
of a program P if and only if v is a fixpoint of Ψ′αP .
From now on, F -fixed models will be called pessimistic, T -fixed models
optimistic, U-fixed models skeptical, and I-fixed models inconsistent. We
can now study the family of α-fixed models.
Theorem 1 Ψ′αP is monotonic under ≤k, and anti-monotonic under ≤t.
Proof. Suppose v1≤kv2. We want to show Ψ
′α
P(v1)≤kΨ
′α
P(v2). Consider
α = F . We define two transfinite sequences of valuations an and bn as follows:
a0 = b0 is the always false valuation, the least in the truth ordering; for all
n+1 successor ordinals, an+1 = Ψ
α
P(an, v1) and bn+1 = Ψ
α
P(bn, v2); for a limit
ordinal λ, aλ =
∨
n<λan and bλ =
∨
n<λbn. Both sequences are increasing in
the truth ordering since ΨαP is monotonic in its first argument. The sequence
an has Ψ
′α
P(v1) as its limit, while the sequence bn has Ψ
′α
P(v2) as its limit, so
it is enough to establish that an≤kbn for every ordinal n.
If n = 0, a0 = b0.
Suppose an≤kbn. Then an+1 = Ψ
α
P(an, v1)≤kΨ
α
P(bn, v2) = bn+1, using the
monotonicity of ΨαP in both arguments under ≤k.
Finally, suppose an≤kbn for every n < λ. V(B) satisfies the infinitary
interlacing conditions so
∨
n<λan ≤k
∨
n<λbn.
The result for α = T ,U , I is established similarly by replacing respec-
tively a0 = b0 (the valuation always false) by the valuation always true,
always unknown, always inconsistent and
∨
by
∧
,
⊕
and
⊗
, respectively.
Anti-monotonicity under the truth ordering is established by a similar
argument.
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Given the monotonicity of Ψ′αP under the knowledge ordering and the
complete lattice structure of V(B) under this ordering, we can apply the
Knaster-Tarski theorem, and we obtain the following result:
Theorem 2 Ψ′αP has a least fixpoint , denoted Fix
α
U , and a greatest fixpoint,
denoted FixαI , with respect to the knowledge ordering.
2
We can remark that the computation of FixαU , that we call α-fixed se-
mantics, is similar to the computation of the well-founded semantics via the
Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation.
Four different semantics can now be associated to a Fitting program, one
for each value of α. The following example shows how these semantics can
be used to provide different contexts, depending on the requirements.
Example. Let P be the following program:
P


Colleague(X, Y ) ← Colleague(Y,X)
Colleague(a, b) ← T
Colleague(a, c) ← F
If we have to send information to persons that we are sure to be colleagues
of b, we have to choose the pessimistic or skeptical semantics. Indeed, under
this semantics, the only person that can be proved to be a colleague of b is
a.
Now, if we want to send information to persons that may be colleagues
of b, then we have to choose the optimistic semantics. There are two persons
that are or may be colleagues of b : a and c. The following table summarizes
the results.
Semantics Coll(a,b) Coll(b,a) Coll(a,c) Coll(c,a) Coll(b,c) Coll(c,b)
FixFU T T F F F F
FixTU T T F F T T
FixUU T T F F U U
FixIU T T F F I I
2Actually, FixαU and Fix
α
I refer both to program P , and should be denoted as Fix
α
P, U
and FixαP, I , respectively. However, in order to simplify the presentation, we shall omit
P in our notations.
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The behavior of Ψ′αP with respect to the truth ordering is less simple
because Ψ′αP is anti-monotonic under this ordering. However, there is a mod-
ification of the Knaster-Tarski theorem dealing with precisely this case:
Lemma 2 ([20]) Suppose that a function f is anti-monotonic on a complete
lattice L. Then there are two elements µ and ν of L, called extreme oscillation
points of f, such that the following hold:
- µ and ν are the least and greatest fixpoint of f 2 (i.e. of f composed with
itself);
- f oscillates between µ and ν in the sense that f(µ) = ν and f(ν) = µ;
- if x and y are also elements of L between which f oscillates then x and y
lie between µ and ν.
As Ψ′αP is anti-monotonic and V(B) is a complete lattice under the truth
ordering, it follows that Ψ′αP has two extreme oscillation points under this
ordering:
Proposition 2 Ψ′αP has two extreme oscillation points denoted Fix
α
F and
FixαT , with Fix
α
F ≤t Fix
α
T , under the truth ordering.
We can now extend the result of [6] to any value of FOUR.
Theorem 3 Let P be a Fitting program. Then we have:
FixαU = Fix
α
F ⊗ Fix
α
T
FixαI = Fix
α
F ⊕ Fix
α
T
FixαF = Fix
α
U ∧ Fix
α
I
FixαT = Fix
α
U ∨ Fix
α
I
Proof.The proof of this theorem is given in the Appendix.
The family of α-fixed models of a program is bounded for each α ∈ FOUR
as follows: in the knowledge ordering, all α-fixed models are between FixαU
and FixαI which are the least and greatest α-fixed models, respectively; in
the truth ordering, all α-fixed models are between FixαF and Fix
α
T which are
not necessarily α-fixed models of P.
It is interesting to note that for α = F the first equality of Theorem
3 relates two different definitions of the well-founded semantics: the left-
hand side, FixαU , represents the definition of Przymusinski [16] via three-
valued stable models, whereas the right-hand side, FixαF ⊗ Fix
α
T , represents
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the definition of Van Gelder via alternating fixpoints [18]. Working with
bilattices, Fitting generalized the approach of Van Gelder in [5] and that of
Przymusinski in [6].
3.3 An algorithm for computing α-fixed semantics
In this section, all literals are ground literals.
An interpretation M = (T, F ) is a pair of sets of atoms where T is the
set of atoms considered as true and F the set of atoms considered as false.
The logical value of an atom A with respect to M is :
• T if A ∈ T and A 6∈ F ,
• F if A 6∈ T and A ∈ F ,
• U if A 6∈ T and A 6∈ F , and
• I if A ∈ T and A ∈ F .
A pseudo-interpretation J = (T, F, T ′, F ′) is composed of four sets of
atoms and assigns to every literal L a logical value as follows:
-if L is a ground atomic formula of the form R(v1, ..., vn) then its logical
value with respect to J is the logical value of R(v1, ..., vn) with respect to
the interpretation (T, F );
-if L is a ground atomic formula of the form ¬R(v1, ..., vn) then its logical
value with respect to J is the negation of the logical value of R(v1, ..., vn)
with respect to the interpretation (T ′, F ′);
The logical value of a formula with respect to a pseudo-interpretation J
is given by the logical value of its literals with respect to J and the truth
tables of the different operators.
The following algorithm uses a bottom-up approach to compute the α-
fixed semantics of a ground Fitting program P with no function symbol over
the bilattice FOUR.
Algorithm: α-fixed semantics
1. begin
2. Res True := ∅;
3. Res False := ∅;
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4. Tmp Res := ({<> },{ <> });
5. match α with
6. α = T ->
Init True := BP ;
Init False := ∅;
Not Head True := { all atoms in BP which are not heads of any rule in P };
Not Head False := ∅;
7. α = F ->
Init True := ∅;
Init False := BP ;
Not Head True := ∅ ;
Not Head False := { all atoms in BP which are not heads of any rule in P };
8. α = I ->
Init True := BP ;
Init False := BP ;
Not Head True := { all atoms in BP which are not heads of any rule in P } ;
Not Head False := { all atoms in BP which are not heads of any rule in P };
9. α = U ->
Init True := ∅;
Init False := ∅;
Not Head True := ∅ ;
Not Head False := ∅;
10. while Tmp Res 6= (Res True,Res False) do
11. Tmp Res = (Res True,Res False);
12. Iter True := Init True;
13. Iter False := Init False;
14. Tmp Iter := ({<> },{<> });
15. while Tmp Iter 6= (Iter True,Iter False) do
16. Tmp Iter = (Iter True,Iter False);
17. Im T := ∅;
18. Im F := ∅;
19. Im I := ∅;
20. for all clauses C in P match the logical value l of the body of C
with respect to the pseudo-interpretation
(Iter True, Iter False, Res True, Res False)
with
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21. l = T -> Im T := Im T ∪ { head(C)}
22. l = F -> Im F := Im F ∪ { head(C)}
23. l = I -> Im I := Im I ∪ { head(C)}
24. end for
25. Iter True := Im T ∪ Im I ∪ Not Head True;
26. Iter False := Im F ∪ Im I ∪ Not Head False;
27. end while
28. Res True := Res True ∪ Iter True;
29. Res False := Res False ∪ Iter False;
30. end while
31. return (Res True,Res False);
32. end.
Intuitively, the assignment of the logical value α to the atoms which are
not heads of any rule is done through the sets of atoms Not Head True and
Not Head False. The value of α also determines the initial value, (Init True,
Init False) of the iterated computation of Ψ′αP(v) performed by the while loop
(lines 15 to 27). Here v corresponds to the interpretation (Res True,Res False),
and (Iter True, Iter False) to the value of a step of this computation. The
first while loop (lines 10 to 30) calculates the sequence of iterated values of
Ψ′αP with U as initial value, and having Fix
α as limit.
This algorithm could be easily modified in order to verify if an interpre-
tation is a α-fixed model of a Fitting program P.
4 Comparing the usual semantics of logic pro-
grams
In this section, we compare the α-fixed models of conventional logic programs
with the usual semantics, then we compare the different usual semantics
among them.
The following theorem states that the family of stable models is included
in the family of pessimistic fixed models (thus extending stable models from
conventionnal logic programs to Fitting programs), and that the well-founded
semantics and the Kripke-Kleene semantics are captured (and similarly ex-
tended) by our appproach.
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Theorem 4 Let P be a conventional logic program.
(1) If v is a three-valued stable model of P, then v is a pessimistic fixed model.
(2) If v is the well-founded semantics of P, then v = FixFU ;
(3) If v is the Kripke-Kleene semantics of P, then v= FixUU .
Proof. The Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation GLP is divided in two
steps: firstly, it transforms the program P in a positive program P/v by
replacing negative literals by their value in the valuation v; then, it applies
to this program the immediate consequence operator ΦP/v. The valuation v
is a stable model if and only if GLP(v) = v.
We have
ΦP /v(w) = Ψ
F
P (w, v),
so,
lfpt λw. ΦP/v(w) = lfpt λw. Ψ
F
P (w, v).
Thus
GLp = Ψ
′F
P
so, if v is a stable model of P, then it is a fixpoint of Ψ′FP and consequently,
a pessimistic fixed model of P.
Thus, (1) is established and (2) is immediate with this proof because the
well-founded semantics of P and FixFU are the least fixpoints under the truth
ordering of GLP and Ψ
′F
P , respectivly.
Concerning (3), we have ΨUP(v, v) = ΦP(v) where ΦP is the Kripke-Kleene
operator. Let KP be the Kripke-Kleene semantics, then we have
KP = lfpk λx. ΦP(x) = lfpk λx. Ψ
U
P(x, x)
Now, FixUU is a fixpoint of λx. Ψ
U
P(x, x),
so KP ≤k Fix
U
U .
In the other direction, we have Ψ′UP(KP) = lfpk(λx. Ψ
U
P(x,KP)
Now, KP is a fixpoint of λx. Ψ
U
P(x,KP), so Ψ
′U
P(KP) ≤k KP .
As FixUU is the least fixpoint of Ψ
′U
P , we have Fix
U
U ≤K KP .
It is important to recall here that, in our approach, positive and negative
information are treated separately during the computation of FixUU . This is
not the case with the computation of Kripke-Kleene semantics. Nevertheless,
when we restrict our attention to conventional programs, the two methods
compute the same semantics. Our approach unifies the computation of usual
semantics, and thus allows us to compare them.
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Theorem 5 Let P be a Fitting program. Then we have:
FixUU ≤k Fix
F
U and Fix
U
U ≤k Fix
T
U .
Proof. Let A be a ground atom. If A does not occurs as the head of
any rule in Inst-P, then
ΨUP(Fix
F
U , F ix
F
U )(A) = U ≤k Fix
F
U (A) = F .
If A occurs as the head of a rule in Inst-P, then
ΨUP(Fix
F
U , F ix
F
U )(A) = Fix
F
U (A)
because FixFU is a fixed model. Thus, we have
ΨUP(Fix
F
U , F ix
F
U ) ≤k Fix
F
U .
As Ψ′UP(Fix
F
U ) is the least fixpoint of λx. Ψ
U
P(x, F ix
F
U ), we have
Ψ′UP(Fix
F
U ) ≤k Fix
F
U .
Now, FixUU is the least fixpoint of Ψ
′U
P , so Fix
U
U ≤k Fix
F
U .
Similarly, FixUU ≤k Fix
T
U .
It follows from Theorem 5 that the skeptical semantics gives less infor-
mation than the pessimistic and optimistic semantics. From this theorem,
we can infer the following result:
Corollary 1 Let P be a Fitting program. Then we have:
FixUU ≤k Fix
F
U ⊗ Fix
T
U
.
Proof. The proof is immediate using the preceding theorem and interla-
cing.
In the previous corollary, the equality is satisfied for positive programs,
but if we accept negation then it is false in general.
This corollary suggests the possibility of defining a new semantics, namely
FixFU ⊗ Fix
T
U , that is smaller than the pessimistic and optimistic semantics
but greater than the skeptical semantics. The following example shows that
this semantics can be useful in certain contexts.
P : A ←− B ∨ ¬B
Semantics of P FixFU Fix
T
U Fix
U
U Fix
F
U ⊗ Fix
T
U
A T T U T
B F T U U
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The program P seems to assert that A is always true (because it is inferred
from either B or ¬B), and this conclusion is reached by both the optimistic
and the pessimistic semantics. However, there is no reason why we should
choose between B true and B false when we cannot assert anything about
the value of B. It seems therefore more natural in this case to take the
consensus between the pessimistic and optimistic semantics, which gives the
value unknown to B.
Although FixFU ⊗ Fix
T
U seems to give an interesting new semantics,
one has to check under what conditions FixFU ⊗ Fix
T
U is actually a model.
Assuming that it is a model, we can call it the consensus semantics.
5 Conclusion
We have defined parametrized semantics for the family of Fitting programs
[6], and an algorithm for their computation. The family of Fitting programs is
very general and includes the conventional logic programs. When we restrict
the class of Fitting programs to the class of conventional logic programs, the
new semantics coincide with the conventional ones. This allows us to compare
conventional semantics in this new setting in which they are embedded. It
also allows us to combine conventional semantics, and thus it suggests the
possibility of defining new semantics such as the consensus semantics that
we proposed in this paper.
Extending this work to logics with signs and annotations is a topic for
future work.
Appendix - Proof of Theorem 3
We need a proposition and a few lemma to prove the next result.
Lemma 3 Let x ∈ V(B). x = (x ∧ U)⊕ (x ∨ U) and F ⊗ T = U .
Proof.
(x ∧ U)⊕ (x ∨ U) = [x⊕ (x ∨ U)] ∧ [U ⊕ (x ∨ U)]
= [(x⊕ x) ∨ (x⊕ U)] ∧ [(U ⊕ x) ∨ (U ⊕ U)]
= [x ∨ x] ∧ [x ∨ U ]
= x ∧ (x ∨ U)
= x.
F is the smallest member of V(B) under the truth ordering so F≤tU and
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using the interlacing conditions, we have : F ⊗ T ≤tU ⊗ T = U .
Similarly, U≤tT , so U = F ⊗ U≤tF ⊗ T .
The three following equations have similar proofs: F ⊕T = I, U ∧I = F
and U ∨ I = T .
Lemma 4 Let a, b, c ∈ V(B). If a≤tb≤tc, then
(1) (a ∧ U)⊗ (c ∨ U) ≤k U ;
(2) (a ∨ U)⊗ c ≤k b;
(3) (a ∧ U)⊗ (c ∧ U) ≤k b .
Proof. Since U≤kF , by the interlacing conditions a ∧ U ≤k a ∧ F = F .
Similarly, c ∨ U ≤k T . Then by the interlacing conditions,
(a ∧ U)⊗ (c ∨ U) ≤k F ⊗ T .
By the precedent lemma, part 1 is established.
Then, using the hypothesis and the interlacing,
(a ∨ U)⊗ c ≤k (a ∨ b)⊗ c = b⊗ c ≤k b.
Finally, (a ∧ U)⊗ (c ∧ U) ≤k (a ∧ U)⊗ (c ∧ b) = (a ∧ U)⊗ b ≤k b.
Now, we can prove the result we need.
Lemma 5 Let a, b, c ∈ V(B). If a≤tb≤tc, then a⊗ c ≤k b.
Proof. Using the precedent lemmas and interlacing,
a⊗ c = [(a ∧ U)⊕ (a ∨ U)]⊗ c
= [(a ∧ U)⊗ c]⊕ [(a ∨ U)⊗ c]
≤k [(a ∧ U)⊗ c]⊕ b
= [(a ∧ U)⊗ ((c ∧ U)⊕ (c ∨ U))]⊕ b
= [(a ∧ U)⊗ (c ∧ U)]⊕ [(a ∧ U)⊗ (c ∨ U)]⊕ b
≤k b⊕ U ⊕ b
= b.
Using a similar proof, the following can also be shown:
(1) if a≤tb≤tc, then b ≤k a⊕ c;
(2) if a≤kb≤kc, then a ∧ c ≤t b;
(3) if a≤kb≤kc, then b ≤t a ∨ c.
Proposition 3 If f is a monotone mapping on a complete lattice, then f
and f 2 have the same least and greatest fixpoints.
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Proof. Let a be the least fixpoint of f and let b be the least fixpoint of f 2.
Every fixpoint of f is also a fixpoint of f 2 and b is the least fixpoint of
f 2, so b ≤ a.
If x is a fixpoint of f 2, then f 2(f(x)) = f(f 2(x)) = f(x) so f(x)is a fixpoint
of f 2. b is the least fixpoint of f 2, so f(b) is a fixpoint of f 2 and b ≤ f(b).
By monotonicity, f(b) ≤ f 2(b) = b, so b = f(b). Since a is the least fixpoint
of f , a ≤ b.
Now, we can prove the result concerning the structure of the family of
αP-fixed models.
Theorem 3 Let P be a Fitting program. Then we have:
FixαU = Fix
α
F ⊗ Fix
α
T
FixαI = Fix
α
F ⊕ Fix
α
T
FixαF = Fix
α
U ∧ Fix
α
I
FixαT = Fix
α
U ∨ Fix
α
I
Proof. the proof is separated in several parts.
Part 1. We want to show that FixαF⊗Fix
α
T and Fix
α
F⊕Fix
α
T are fixpoints
of Ψ′αP in order to have Fix
α
U ≤k Fix
α
F ⊗ Fix
α
T and Fix
α
F ⊕ Fix
α
T ≤k Fix
α
I .
By monotonicity of Ψ′αP under knowledge ordering, we have
Ψ′αP(Fix
α
F ⊗ Fix
α
T ) ≤k Ψ
′α
P(Fix
α
F ) = Fix
α
T ,
Ψ′αP(Fix
α
F ⊗ Fix
α
T ) ≤k Ψ
′α
P(Fix
α
T ) = Fix
α
F .
So Ψ′αP(Fix
α
F ⊗P-Fix
α
T ) ≤k Fix
α
F ⊗ Fix
α
T .
Also, FixαF ≤t Fix
α
T , so, by interlacing,
FixαF = Fix
α
F ⊗ Fix
α
F ≤t Fix
α
F ⊗ Fix
α
T ≤t Fix
α
T ⊗ Fix
α
T = Fix
α
T ,
and, by anti-monotonicity of Ψ′αP under the truth ordering,
Ψ′αP(Fix
α
T ) ≤t Ψ
′α
P(Fix
α
T ⊗ Fix
α
T ) ≤t Ψ
′α
P(Fix
α
F),
so,
FixαF ≤t Ψ
′α
P(Fix
α
T ⊗ Fix
α
T ) ≤t Fix
α
T .
Using the precedent lemma,
FixαF ⊗ Fix
α
T ≤t Ψ
′α
P(Fix
α
F ⊗ Fix
α
T ).
We have shown that FixαF ⊗ Fix
α
T is a fixed point of Ψ
′α
P .
The proof for FixαF ⊕ Fix
α
T is dual.
FixαU and Fix
α
I are the least and greatest fixpoints of Ψ
′α
P , so part 1 is
established.
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Part 2. We show now the other direction.
FixαF and Fix
α
T are the two extremal oscillation points of Ψ
′α
P under the
truth ordering, so
FixαF ≤t Fix
α
U ≤t Fix
α
T ,
Thus, using the precedent lemma,
FixαF ⊗ Fix
α
T ≤t Fix
α
U .
The proof of the other inequality is dual. The two first equality of the theo-
rem are established.
Part 3. In this part, we show the last two equality.
Ψ′αP is monotonic under the knowledge ordering and its least and greatest
fixpoints are FixαU and Fix
α
I . Under the knowledge ordering, (Ψ
′α
P)
2 is also
monotonic and, using the precedent proposition, has the same least and
greatest fixpoints. (Ψ′αP)
2 is also monotonic under the truth ordering and its
least and greatest fixpoints under this ordering are FixαF et Fix
α
T .
We have
FixαU ∧ Fix
α
I ≤t Fix
α
U
So
(Ψ′αP)
2(FixαU ∧ Fix
α
I) ≤t (Ψ
′α
P)
2(FixαU) = Fix
α
U
and, similarly, (Ψ′αP)
2(FixαU ∧ Fix
α
I) ≤t Fix
α
I .
Consequently, using the fact that FixαF is the least fixpoint of (Ψ
′α
P)
2
under the truth ordering,
FixαF ≤t Fix
α
U ∧ Fix
α
I .
Further, FixαF is a fixpoint of (Ψ
′α
P)
2, and FixαU and Fix
α
I are its least
and greatest fixpoints, so
FixαU ≤k Fix
α
F ≤k Fix
α
I
Thus, using the lemma,
FixαU ∧ Fix
α
I ≤t Fix
α
F .
The last part is dual.
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